摘 要
管理层股权激励作为现代企业治理的重要手段，其对企业盈余管理行为的影响日益受到关注。在当前经济环境下，随着资本市场发展和公司治理结构优化，如何平衡管理层利益与股东权益成为研究焦点。本研究旨在探讨管理层股权激励机制与企业盈余管理行为之间的内在联系，通过构建理论模型并运用实证分析方法，基于2010 - 2020年间沪深两市A股上市公司数据，采用多元回归分析、倾向得分匹配等统计工具进行深入剖析。研究发现，适度的股权激励能够有效约束管理层盈余管理行为，降低盈余管理程度；然而，当股权激励强度过高时，则可能诱发过度盈余管理现象。此外，不同行业特征、公司规模以及股权集中度等因素对二者关系存在显著调节效应。本研究创新性地引入了动态股权激励视角，并结合中国资本市场特殊背景展开讨论，为完善我国上市公司治理结构提供了重要参考依据，丰富了现有股权激励与盈余管理领域的研究成果，有助于监管部门制定更加科学合理的政策框架，促进资本市场的健康发展。
关键词：管理层股权激励 盈余管理行为 公司治理结构
Abstract
Management equity incentives, as an important tool in modern corporate governance, have increasingly attracted attention for their impact on corporate earnings management behavior. In the current economic environment, with the development of capital markets and the optimization of corporate governance structures, balancing managerial interests and shareholder rights has become a focal point of research. This study aims to explore the intrinsic relationship between management equity incentive mechanisms and corporate earnings management behavior by constructing a theoretical model and employing empirical analysis methods. Based on data from A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2010 and 2020, this research utilizes statistical tools such as multiple regression analysis and propensity score matching for in-depth analysis. The findings indicate that moderate equity incentives can effectively constrain managerial earnings management behavior and reduce the degree of earnings management; however, when the intensity of equity incentives is too high, it may induce excessive earnings management phenomena. Moreover, factors such as industry characteristics, company size, and equity concentration significantly moderate this relationship. Innovatively, this study introduces a dynamic perspective on equity incentives and discusses it within the unique context of China's capital market, providing crucial references for improving the governance structure of listed companies in China. It enriches existing research on equity incentives and earnings management and assists regulatory authorities in formulating more scientific and reasonable policy fr ameworks, thereby promoting the healthy development of capital markets.
Keyword:Management Equity Incentive Earnings Management Behavior Corporate Governance Structure
目 录
引言 1
1管理层股权激励的理论基础 1
1.1管理层股权激励的概念界定 1
1.2管理层股权激励的理论发展 2
1.3管理层股权激励的作用机制 2
2企业盈余管理行为分析 3
2.1盈余管理行为的定义与类型 3
2.2盈余管理的动机与手段 3
2.3盈余管理对企业的影响 4
3股权激励对盈余管理影响的实证研究 4
3.1研究假设的提出 4
3.2研究方法与数据来源 5
3.3实证结果与分析 5
4政策建议与未来展望 6
4.1完善股权激励制度的建议 6
4.2规范盈余管理行为的措施 7
4.3研究局限与未来方向 7
结论 8
参考文献 9
致谢 10
