摘要
管理层股权激励作为现代企业治理的重要工具，其对企业长期财务绩效的影响已成为学术界和实务界关注的焦点。本研究基于中国A股上市公司2010年至2020年的面板数据，采用双重差分法（DID）结合固定效应模型，探讨管理层股权激励计划实施后对企业长期财务绩效的具体影响及其作用机制。研究发现，管理层股权激励显著提升了企业的长期财务绩效，这种提升主要通过优化资源配置、降低代理成本以及增强管理层与股东利益一致性来实现。进一步分析表明，激励效果在股权集中度较高、外部监督较弱的企业中更为明显，而在竞争性行业中的表现优于垄断性行业。此外，本研究还发现，股权激励的长期效应存在一定的滞后性，通常在激励计划实施后的第三年开始显现并逐步增强。相较于现有文献，本研究的创新点在于引入了动态视角，揭示了股权激励对财务绩效影响的时间路径，并结合企业异质性特征深入剖析了激励效果的边界条件。研究结果不仅为管理层股权激励的有效性提供了经验证据，也为完善企业激励机制设计和政策制定提供了重要参考。
关键词：管理层股权激励；长期财务绩效；双重差分法；代理成本；企业异质性
Abstract
As an important tool in modern corporate governance, managerial equity incentives have become a focal point of attention in both academic and practical circles regarding their impact on firms' long-term financial performance. Based on panel data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2010 and 2020, this study employs a Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach combined with a fixed-effects model to investigate the specific influence of managerial equity incentive plans on long-term financial performance and their underlying mechanisms after implementation. The findings indicate that managerial equity incentives significantly enhance long-term financial performance, primarily through optimizing resource allocation, reducing agency costs, and strengthening the alignment of interests between management and shareholders. Further analysis reveals that the incentive effects are more pronounced in firms with higher equity concentration and weaker external supervision, and they perform better in competitive industries compared to monopolistic ones. Additionally, this study finds that the long-term effects of equity incentives exhibit a certain degree of lag, typically becoming evident and gradually intensifying starting from the third year after the implementation of the incentive plan. Compared with existing literature, the innovation of this study lies in introducing a dynamic perspective, uncovering the time path of the impact of equity incentives on financial performance, and conducting an in-depth analysis of the boundary conditions of incentive effects by integrating firm heterogeneity characteristics. The results not only provide empirical evidence for the effectiveness of managerial equity incentives but also offer significant references for improving the design of corporate incentive mechanisms and policy formulation.
Keywords：Management Equity Incentive; Long-Term Financial Performance; Difference-In-Differences Method; Agency Cost; Firm Heterogeneity
目 录
摘要 I
Abstract II
一、绪论 1
(一) 研究背景与意义 1
(二) 国内外研究现状综述 1
(三) 研究方法与技术路线 1
二、管理层股权激励的理论基础 2
(一) 激励机制的核心概念 2
(二) 长期财务绩效的衡量标准 3
(三) 理论框架与假设构建 3
三、管理层股权激励对企业长期财务绩效的影响机制 4
(一) 激励强度与企业价值的关系 4
(二) 股权激励对管理层行为的影响 4
(三) 长期绩效驱动因素分析 5
四、实证研究与案例分析 5
(一) 数据来源与样本选择 5
(二) 实证模型设计与变量定义 6
(三) 案例研究与结果讨论 7
结 论 8
参考文献 9
